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Small Group Performance: 
Reinterpreting Proximate Evaluations from an Ultimate Perspective 
Erich H. Witte and Cara H. Kahl 
University of Hamburg 
 
Abstract: 
In this article, two scientific approaches are conjoined: Small group research and 
evolutionary theory. In the past 50 years, small group researchers have identified 
various deficits in group performance. Presently, how to improve group interaction is a 
focal point of their work. Meanwhile, social psychologists are paying more attention to 
evolutionary theory, and process losses in group performance may be evaluated 
differently from such a perspective. It appears that proximate performance losses could 
mean ultimate gains for the individual. A reduction in group performance should 
therefore be anticipated from a proximate perspective, because it represents an 
individual selection advantage from the ultimate view. As a means of intervention, group 
facilitation techniques are the key to proximate gains in group processes. 
 
Keywords: evolutionary theory, group process, proximate evaluation, small group 
research, ultimate evaluation. 
 Small Group Performance: 
Reinterpreting Proximate Evaluations from an Ultimate Perspective 
 
In today’s ever-changing world, group-level potential is indispensable for solving 
complex tasks. However, individual patterns of behavior may not be optimized to fulfill 
collective goals. Although small groups such as political cabinets, court juries, medical 
and marketing teams play a significant role in society’s functioning, scientists evaluating 
group performance criticize their observable process losses. Over the past 50 years, 
small group research focused chiefly on the discovery of deficient group performance 
(Kerr & Tindale, 2004; Williams, Harkins & Karau, 2003). During the same period, 
contributions made in evolutionary social psychology (Kameda & Tindale, 2004; 
Simpson & Kenrick, 1997) revealed that the homo sapiens lives in conditions eminently 
affected by the group context (Kameda & Tindale, 2004, 2006). If groups actually 
perform so poorly although we need them to survive, extinction of humankind should 
have emerged long ago (cp. Wilson, 1997; Yeager, 2001; Caporael, Wilson, Hemelrijk & 
Sheldon, 2005).  
 
Assessing Small Group Performance: The Proximate Evaluation Style 
 
Until now, small group researchers have defined collective performance as the 
achievement of current, short-term goals. The present serves as the time dimension for 
observing performance, and group performance is therefore evaluated using results 
assessed in concrete situations. Subsequently, group success is predicted on the basis 
of statistical models (Witte & Davis, 1996). They were developed to compare individual 
to group performance, because these forms are characterized by different system 
levels. The key idea is to statistically predict a group’s performance level by modeling it 
with average individual behavior for n group members. Then, this measure is compared 
to the behavioral results shown by real groups in concrete situations (Davis, 1973; 
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 Steiner, 1972). A group’s size influences performance estimation and it should be 
controlled in such models. 
This evaluation style is similar to proximate causation, despite varying 
approaches to the latter term’s definition (cp. Ariew, 2003). First introduced by Mayr 
(1961), proximate causation is an expression used when scientists describe how 
observed patterns of behavior operate (Tinbergen, 1963). For instance, researchers can 
evaluate a group on the basis of its structural elements, i.e. individuals, situation and 
organizational context, and the way they causally affect the group’s resulting potential. 
In searching for proximate causes, the following questions can be asked from a social 
psychological perspective: How does a particular social phenomenon function? Which 
elements are identifiable? How do the latter interact? Is the interaction systematic? 
Proximate questions therefore address immediate causes of behavior, and as Wilson 
(1975, p. 23) states, such machinery operates “within the lifetimes of organisms, and 
sometimes even within milliseconds…” (see also Mayr, 1961; Tinbergen, 1963).  
How is behavior evaluated from a proximate perspective? Firstly, immediate 
behavior is observed. Secondly, the outcome, e.g. group performance, is compared to 
optimally functioning machinery, i.e. statistical group performance. To avoid confusion, 
performance will be defined in terms of input and output.  The term (O) stands for 
performance output. We will further distinguish between group output as a baseline 
(Ogb) and as an empirically estimated value (Oge). Individual output will be addressed 
later in the text as required. See Figure 1 for more. In sum, scientists using this 
evaluation frame intend to assess how well a group functions. 
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Figure 1: Human performance defined as input (I) and output (O). Individual input can be performed in 
either a single (s) or group (g) context. Output is defined on a group or individual basis, which 
simultaneously defines the context (group vs. single). Group output can further be assessed using 
different algorithms: baseline vs. empirical estimation. 
 
 
Reassessing Small Group Performance: The Ultimate Evaluation Style 
 
While the proximate evaluation style focuses on the mechanisms shaping 
behavior, i.e. how the group performs compared to expectations or ideals, broader 
explanations for group behavior are not given.  In applying the ultimate evaluation style 
to group performance, researchers move from asking how behavior happens to why it 
occurs.  This is a different kind of explanation, because instead of clarifying how 
interacting elements such as individuals, situation and context affect how behavior 
functions, scientists applying an ultimate evaluation style investigate a behavior’s 
purpose.  Moreover, we search for the reasons which lead behavioral machinery to 
function in a certain manner. Ultimate causation, i.e. why observed behavior occurs, 
operates via proximate causation (Wilson, 1975, p. 23). This relation is comparable to 
the distinction between genotype and phenotype.  
 4
 Remember that the proximate evaluation style incorporates average individual 
performance to model group behavior. This perspective does not focus on the 
individual, but rather on n persons aggregated in one more or less optimally functioning 
group. Different, momentarily occurring influences are then held accountable for the 
quality of performance shown by the group as an entity (cp. Baron & Kerr, 2003; 
Forsyth, 2006; Wilke & Meertens, 1994). The ultimate evaluation style, on the contrary, 
focuses on individual behavior to facilitate broader causal interpretations. This 
perspective is more complex and it compares individual input to the output measured in 
single and group contexts. The relationship between input and output in a single context 
(Os/Is) and in a group context (Og/Ig) is the comparison evaluated with the ultimate style.  
To understand why collective behavior occurs in the manner it does, small group 
researchers must ask themselves what advantages it has for the single member. 
Therefore, solely comparing group output (Og) with a baseline model does not suffice. 
For broader causal interpretations, we propose comparing the relation between output 
and input in both single and group contexts. 
In evolutionary biology, survivorship and fertility are the basis for ultimate 
causation (Wilson, 1975, p. 23; Schaller, Boyd & Richerson, 2005; Simpson & Kenrick, 
2006).  Specifically, this means behavior patterns which individually improve the 
chances of survival and reproduction, i.e. of genome transfer, will be genetically 
maintained via natural selection (cp. Bass, 1998, p. 100). On an individual level, 
behavior represents an individual advantage if group performance exceeds single 
performance. According to evolutionary theory, group behavior will be modified so that 
an individual gain in performance results. The concept of group selection (Sober & 
Wilson, 1998; Wilson, 1997; Wilson & Sober, 1994; Kameda & Tindale, 2006) is not 
necessary to demonstrate ultimate group advantages for individuals (Yeager, 2001), 
because not the group but rather the individual gains an advantage in selection. As 
Boyd & Richerson (2005) summarize:  
Thus, beliefs that are costly to the individual should diminish, while beliefs that 
are beneficial to individuals should spread. Extensive theoretical analysis suggests that 
group selection can counteract this process only if groups are very small and migration 
among groups is very limited. (p. 205)  
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 Putting Small Group Performance in Perspective 
 
In this contribution, the ultimate evaluation style will refer generally to 
interpretations of behavior which emphasize individual usefulness, i.e. supra-situational 
causation supporting evolution theory and its implications for genome transition. Small 
group researchers can ask themselves why a particular group behavior happens and if 
there is an advantage for individuals when they perform in a group context (Og/Ig). The 
proximate evaluation style will refer to the immediate mechanisms of group behavior, 
i.e. how behavior functions. It focuses on specific and current group performance, e.g. 
the comparison of collective output with a baseline model (Oge/Ogb). These evaluation 
styles incorporate different time spans and objectives (functionality vs. purposefulness). 
In our view, proximate and ultimate perspectives need to be distinguished when 
assessing group performance.  
In this contribution, we will interpret social psychological phenomena, i.e. 
problem solving, social loafing, helping behavior, information sharing and creativity, 
from both proximate and ultimate perspectives. The present question is whether human 
beings interacting in natural groups are affected by their behavioral biology in such a 
way that proximate losses have to be expected. This question will become even more 
important once we demonstrate that group losses, proximately evaluated, may be 
interpreted as advantages for individual selection. Human beings normally behave in a 
way that supplies them with an individual advantage (Og/Ig > Os/Is; Williams et. al., 
2003). Such behavior may interfere with overall performance, resulting in a poorer team 
evaluation, because on a proximate level the group and not the individual is evaluated 
(ideally Ogb < Oge).  
In this article, theoretical descriptions of several group processes are presented. 
Firstly, we will illustrate them from the traditional, proximate perspective and 
subsequently complement them with an ultimate interpretation. Finally, we compare 
both approaches and draw conclusions for theory as well as for social practice. We will 
demonstrate that proximate and ultimate evaluations are not contradictory, but rather 
can be understood on the basis of differing theoretical backgrounds. With these 
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 intentions in mind, we hope social psychologists will develop a better understanding of 
group behavior as it is observed proximately (Kameda & Tindale, 2006). 
 
Cognitive Group Performance 
 
Proximate Evaluations of Cognitive Group Performance 
According to small group researchers (Forsyth, 2006; Witte & Davis, 1996), 
groups master specific tasks better than the average person alone due to collective 
learning processes and group consensus. Generally, to evaluate cognitive group 
performance, either the value for the best individual or the well-known equation on 
group level is used (Lorge & Solomon, 1955; see the quadrant proximate, estimated 
performance in Table 1). The latter equation theoretically expresses that group 
members “optimally adapt to present conditions”, meaning the correct solution is given 
by only one person and is accepted by the others (“truth wins”; Davis, 1973). This 
assumption only works with “eureka” problems in which solutions are instantly 
comprehensible (Steiner, 1972), and groups normally perform worse on other types of 
problem solving tasks (Kerr & Tindale, 2004). Moreover, groups often perform as well 
as their second best group member (“truth-supported wins”; Stasser, Kerr & Davis, 
1989), and to a certain degree, they possess an advantage over individuals, because 
the collective compensates for individual errors (Kerr, MacCoun & Kramer, 1994). 
Laughlin, Bonner and Miner (2002) even hypothesized that groups perform better than 
the best individual due to mutual stimulation, i.e. groups make less mistakes and give 
more correct responses even if no member knows the correct solution. This is a 
classical, yet rare synergy effect on group level. Nevertheless, cognitive group 
performance is assessed as being highly deficient by researchers evaluating with a 
proximate style. Empirical groups, namely, do not achieve the performance quality 
expected by the above theoretical assumptions. Generally, cognitive group performance 
on non-eureka problems functions according to the majority rule (Davis, 1996). This 
leads to a decrease in the probability for task solution. See the quadrant proximate, 
actual performance in Table 1 for this equation; the table summarizes this section.  
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Ultimate Evaluation of Cognitive Group Performance 
In using the proximate evaluation style, small group researchers assume 
maximum consensus on a suggested correct solution. Group-level performance is 
thereby assessed, and this aspect marks progress in research opposed to the initial 
comparison of group with individual performance (Davis, 1973). However, to use an 
ultimate evaluation style, it is necessary to extract the individual advantage from overall 
group performance. Maximum agreement with other group members is defined by P = 
pn (P: probability of group performance; p: probability of average individual 
performance; n: group size). This equation means that a solution will only be found if all 
group members know it. In log-linear terms, there will be no individual gain in this case. 
The individual probability of finding a solution log p corresponds to the average 
probability of group performance (log P) / n.  
The two extremes, i.e. either all or just one group member knows the correct 
solution, neither incorporate the potential faultiness of a given solution to a complex 
problem, implying that more than one person should know the “right” answer to ensure 
task success, nor the possibility of correcting an answer by integrating varying 
perspectives instead of just producing one single answer accepted by all group 
members.  
Furthermore, the majority rule represents an advantage compared to the 
individual probability of finding the right solution only when p > 0.50, i.e. individual 
knowledge is available and the solution is not arbitrary. The increase in group 
performance is especially noticeable in groups of 3 < n < 7 and when the individual 
solution has a probability of 0.66 < p < 0.87 (Grofman, 1978). Hence, small groups 
encountering a problem which is neither too difficult nor too simple provide an individual 
advantage when a majority decision is used. Yet when proximately evaluated, overall 
group performance remarkably deviates from the maximum possible solution. However, 
from an ultimate view, the majority decision rule represents the optimal solution under 
these circumstances, because it provides the individual with a correct alternative and 
therewith a high guarantee for task success. In other words, one person alone is less 
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 likely to solve the problem than the group majority (Hastie & Kameda, 2005). In 
evaluating groups with this ultimate focus, an advantage for individuals clearly results. 
Individuals are more likely to reach the correct solution by performing in a group and the 
effort needed to do so is justified by this increase in performance. Please refer to Table 
1 for a summary of this section. 
 
Table1 
Cognitive Performance from Proximate and Ultimate Perspectives 
 Performance types compared 
Evaluation style Empirical Baseline 
Proximate evaluation aOge = 1 – (1-p)x Ogb = 1 – (1-p)n
Ultimate evaluation Os / Is  = p bOge / Ig = 1 – (1-p) x / n 
 
Note. O: Performance / output as a probability (Oge: group output as an empirical estimation and Ogb: as a 
baseline measure; Os: individual output in single context); p: Probability of correct average individual 
performance; n: Group size; I: Individual input in a group (Ig) and single (Is) context. For example: p=0.70, 
n=5, x= 5-3 (the minimal majority for a group solution). The exponent x counts the members who do not 
know the solution. Oge   = 0.81; Ogb  =  0.998; 
Os / Is  = 0.70; Oge / Ig  = 0.81. 
aMajority rule: x = minority of false solvers and x < n/2. 
bIf the group solution is accepted by individuals. 
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 Motivational Group Performance 
 
Proximate Evaluations of Motivational Group Performance 
Bringing people together in a group is expected enhance individual task 
motivation. Yet although this synergy effect is awaited, it very seldom occurs. For long-
term or permanent tasks, effort rates decreases about 10% per additional group 
member (Moede, 1920; Latané, 1981). This reduction is less for maximum tasks, for 
which an asymptote of 75% is reached (Forsyth, 2006; Zysno, 1998). The shorter the 
interval is, the smaller the decrease in performance will be.  
Under the simplest of circumstances, motivational group performance is 
expected equate Ogb = E * n (Forsyth, 2006; Zysno, 1998; see quadrant II in, Table 2). 
However, individual motivation is subject to numerous context effects when single 
people perform in a group (Williams, Harkins & Karau, 2003). Generally, the following 
description holds for social loafing (Latané, 1981; Zysno, 1998): Oge = E * n w (see 
quadrant I in Table 2).  A reasonable estimation for the efficiency parameter is w = 0.74 
(see Zysno, 1998). The fact that individuals working in groups reduce their effort 
(Williams, Harkins & Karau, 2003) is a well-known and stable effect. The explanation of 
this effect, however, is still unclear. The formula in quadrant I in Table 2 is only a 
description of the observed results when at least two people work together. The 
parameter w is less than 1 due to social loafing or the Ringelmann effect. Each new 
individual increases the group performance level, but does so less than under single 
conditions. Please refer to Table 2 for a summary of this section. 
 
Ultimate Evaluation of Motivational Group Performance 
The ultimate perspective does not focus on individual effort (input) in a group 
context, but rather on the average relation between individual input and output in group 
and single contexts. From an individual’s point of view, less effort (input) needed for 
group (Ig) than for single performance (Is). This subjective comparison between both 
contexts leads to a reduction in individual effort in a group situation (Ig), because the 
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 observed overall group performance (Og) exceeds the level of individual performance in 
a single condition (Os). Please refer to Table 2 for an overview. Group output is higher 
than individual output (Og > Os) and is achieved with less effort (w < 1). In using the 
ultimate evaluation style, the individual reduction of effort in a group context can be an 
advantage for a single person. By reducing performance motivation in a group context, 
the individual can avoid exerting strenuous effort otherwise necessary for single 
performance and conserve energy for other responsibilities. At the same time, overall 
group performance exceeds individual performance in a single condition. Contrary to 
comparisons made on the basis of the proximate evaluation style, the individual 
condition is the reference performance level for conclusions made using the ultimate 
evaluation style. In other words, the group performs better than an individual could 
alone, and the individual can even reduce effort while still profiting from group 
performance (Feuchter, 2001). For instance, a group can build a house much faster 
than a single person alone even if individual effort is reduced. Please refer to Table 2 for 
a summary of this section. 
 
Table 2 
Motivational Performance from Proximate and Ultimate Perspectives 
 Performance types compared 
Evaluation style Empirical Baseline 
Proximate evaluation aOge = E * nw Ogb = E * n 
Ultimate evaluation Os / Is  = E Oge / Ig = Oge / nw
 
Note. O: Performance / output as a probability (Oge: group output as an empirical estimation and Ogb: as a 
baseline measure; Os: individual output in single context); E: Probability of Individual Performance (Effort); 
n: Group size; w : Efficiency parameter; w<1; I: Individual input in a group (Ig) and single (Is) context; Os / 
Is: Relationship between individual effort (input) and individual output (performance) in a single condition; 
Oge / Ig: Relationship between individual input (effort) and group output in a group situation. For example: 
If w=0.74 (Zysno, 1998) and # 
n = 5, then Oe= 3.29 E. Thus, O/I = 1.43E with n/nw = 1.43. If w =1, then there is no ultimate advantage 
because no reduction in effort occurs. If w = 0, then there is a disadvantage of being in a group, because 
individual input is reduced.  
a w < 1. 
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 Helping Behavior 
 
Proximate Evaluations of Helping Behavior 
According to the well-known bystander effect, individuals are less likely to help in 
an emergency if they are in a group. The following equation denotes this relation 
(Grofman, 1974): Oge = 1 – (1-p)1/n (see quadrant I in Table 3). In a classical experiment 
by Latané & Darley (1968), a reaction probability of p = 0.75 was found for individuals 
and P = 0.38 for a three-member group. The relation between the failure to render 
assistance in a group (1-P) and the individual failure to do so (1-p)1/n is constant when 
expressed in log-linear terms:  
log(1-0.38) = -0.21 and log(1-0.75)/3 = -0.20.  
Please refer to Table 3 for a summary of this section. 
 
Ultimate Evaluation of Helping Behavior 
Rendering help in an emergency represents an individual threat and can reduce 
the helper’s probability of survival. From a victim’s point of view, however, receiving help 
increases the chance of survival. At this point, the question is whether groups can offer 
individuals an ultimate advantage (Grofman, 1978): 
 
P = 1 – (1-p)1/n       Æ       log (1- P) = log (1-p)/ n 
log (1-p)/ n   
Log (1-0.38) = -0.21  
Log (1-0.75)/3 = -0.20 
 
If rendering help can be reduced without a decrease in the help received, the 
group poses an advantage for the individual. According to the values mentioned above, 
the victim’s chance of survival in a group condition remains constant, but the individual’s 
helping behavior can be reduced according to the number of potential helpers. This 
decreases the threat for the individual helper and denotes an ultimate advantage for 
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 each single one. Quadrant III in Table 3 illustrates this phenomenon; refer the table for a 
summary of this section. 
 
Table 3 
Helping Behavior from Proximate and Ultimate Perspectives 
 Performance types compared 
Evaluation style Empirical Baseline 
Proximate evaluation Oge = 1 – (1-p)1/n Ogb = 1 – (1-p)n
Ultimate evaluation Os / Is  = p aOge / Ig = log(1-p) / 
n 
 
Note. O: Performance / output as a probability (Oge: group output as an empirical estimation and Ogb: as a 
baseline measure; Os: individual output in single context); p: Probability of average individual helping 
behavior; n: Group size; I : Individual input in a group (Ig) and single (Is) context; Os / Is: Relationship 
between individual input and individual output in a single condition; Oge / Ig: Relationship between 
individual input and group output in a group situation. 





Proximate Evaluations of Group Performance in Sharing Information 
According to the shared-view effect, topics familiar to all participants are 
especially likely to be mentioned during a discussion (Forsyth, 2006). The following 
equation denotes the probability of information being mentioned during a conversation 
(Stasser, 1992):  
D(I) = 1- (1- d) n. See Table 4 for more on this formula. 
For d = 0.50, the probability in a five-person group with all members having 
knowledge of the information is D(I) = 0.97. Shared information will therefore become 
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 salient even if it is only coincidently mentioned by individual members. This advantage 
results from the fact that any member can produce the information. Contrarily, this 
finding indicates rare expert knowledge will seldom be mentioned in a discussion limited 
by time. Yet precisely this specific information is the reason for forming expert groups. 
Researchers evaluating group performance with the proximate evaluation style assess 
information sharing in groups as deficient (Forsyth, 2006, pp. 342-345). To date, 
however, no generally accepted baseline model exists. In deriving a simple method for 
a baseline model, the bystander effect can be reconsidered. Help reduction is described 
by a model which can represent a theoretical baseline for the expected reduction of 
shared information in a discussion:  D(I) = 1-(1-d) 1/n . If d = 0.50 and n = 5, then  
D(I) = 1-(1-0.50)1/5 = 1-0.87= 0.13. In other terms, if the group discussion concentrates 
on new, unshared information (1- D(I)), it depends on individual unshared information 
(1-d) and the latter’s probability is further reduced by the number of group members, 
because each one contributes further unshared information. 
 
Ultimate Evaluation of Group Performance in Sharing Information 
In a relatively stationary surrounding, group members are expected to share 
relevant information (Hastie & Kameda, 2005; Kameda & Tindale, 2006). Using 
common information for decision-making represents an ultimate advantage, because it 
is probably more statistically valid and reliable than unshared information is (Kameda & 
Tindale, 2006). Groups attain information with a higher probability than individuals, 
because knowledge is more likely to emerge in a discussion than during solitary 
reflection (Wittenbaum, Hubbell & Zuckerman, 1999). Thus, information exchange 
during a limited discussion depends on two parameters: individual knowledge (d) and 
group size (n). Information exchange during a discussion can be empirically described 
by the formula used for baseline group problem solving on cognitive tasks. In the 
present case, however, the parameters do not characterize problem solving, but rather 
the mentioning of information. In an individual context, a person can only use 
experience as information, and it might be unreliable and less valid than information 
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 shared with and corrected by others. How salient information in a group discussion 
becomes also depends on the experiences other subjects share. For example: In a five-
person group, individual use of information is d = 0.30. That means the chance the 
information is not used equates  
0.70 = antilog(1-0.30) = 10 -0.15. In a five person group, 0.18 = 10 5(-0.15) = 10 -0.75 . 
Obviously, the relevant, shared information becomes much more salient in a group 




Information Sharing from Proximate and Ultimate Perspectives 
 Performance types compared 
Evaluation style Empirical Baseline 
Proximate evaluation Oge = D(I) = 1 – (1-
d)n
Ogb =1 – (1-d) 1/n
Ultimate evaluation Os / Is  = log(1-d) Oge / Ig = n(log(1-d))
 
Note. O: Information sharing / output as a probability (Oge: group output as an empirical estimation and 
Ogb: as a baseline measure; Os: individual output in single context); d: Probability of information being 
mentioned during discussion; n: Group size; I: Individual input (salient information) in a group (Ig) and 
single (Is) context; Os/Is: Relationship between individual input (salience before discussion) and individual 
output (salience without discussion) in a single condition; Oge/Ig: Relationship between individual input 
(salience before discussion) and group output in a group situation (individual salience after group 
discussion). 
 
   
Creativity 
 
Proximate Evaluations of Group Creativity 
In this section, considerations will depart from idea generation as a manifest of 
creative behavior. Numerous findings (Paulus & Nijstad, 2003) convincingly illustrate 
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 that performance on creative tasks moderated by the brainstorming method, lags 
behind idea-generating behavior exhibited by simulated groups of the same size. These 
findings can best be explained by the blocking effect (Stroebe & Diehl, 1994).  
Analogously, the model used for group motivation can also be applied to group 
creativity (Zysno, 1998): Under the simplest of circumstances, creative group 
performance should equate Ogb = C * n (see quadrant II, Table 5). However, individual 
motivation and production are subject to numerous group context effects. Members 
cease their productivity if they feel group creativity is higher than their individual 
potential (Nijstad, Stroebe & Lodewijkx, 2003). That is why creative group output is 
preferably estimated as Oge = C * nw (see quadrant I in Table 5)  
Ultimate Evaluation of Group Creativity 
The ultimate perspective does not focus on individual creative input in a group 
context, but rather on the average relation between individual input (production of ideas) 
and individual output (quality and quantity of new ideas) in both group and single 
contexts. If the group is creative to an extent the individual considers appropriate, 
individual group members will reduce their productivity (Nijstad, Stroebe & Lodewijkx, 
2003). This subjective comparison between both contexts leads to a reduction in 
individual effort in a group situation, because the observed overall group performance 
(Oge) exceeds the level of individual performance in a single condition (Is; see quadrant 
IV in Table 5). Group output is higher than individual output  
(Oge > Os) and is achieved with less effort (w < 1).  The creative contributions 
made in a group may not have emerged if an individual worked alone. The subjective 
frame of reference is therefore the evaluation of individual performance compared to 
total (individual vs. group) output. Note that evaluation on a group level is only available 
to the researcher, i.e. from an external perspective both group and individual conditions 
can be analyzed regarding total creative performance. From an individual perspective, 
however, group process losses will not be recognized in everyday life (Stroebe, Diehl & 
Abakoumkin, 1996). Conversely, group performance gains will be noticed from a 
subjective frame of reference.  
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 Group Performance without Process Gains: Individual Advantages 
 
Proximate Evaluations of Solving Complex Problems 
The actual complexities underlying most real-life problems arise when an 
"eigendynamic" or idiosyncratic dynamism is experienced among a large number of 
connected variables (Funke, 1992). Naturally, the complexity experienced when working 
on such a task is often greatly increased when variables remain unknown or 
ambiguous. Computer simulations can provide such problems for use in group-task 
studies. Such methods model reality, i.e. a world of variables with pre-defined 
relationships, and this model may be accessed and altered by participants in a multitude 
of ways (Frensch & Funke, 1995). In using simulated realities, small group researchers 
bring problems into the lab, which are comparable with highly complex problems in 
everyday life (Badke-Schaub, 1994). Groups work several hours in two or more 
sessions on such problems (Witte & Sack, 1999).  According to findings in experimental 
research, groups do not differ from randomly selected persons on these tasks (Witte & 
Sack, 1999). Moreover, the quality of group performance is roughly the same to that of 
an average individual, thereby implying costs of group interaction seem to lead to a 
disadvantage, because error compensation does not occur. 
 
Ultimate Evaluations of Solving Complex Problems 
Is there an analogy for this group phenomenon within the evolution of mankind? 
The task of hunting in groups represents one example. Group hunting is a very complex 
activity affected by manifold influences. It can be compared to solving complex tasks, 
which are often characterized by a lack of transparency, inherent dynamics, long-term 
effects and complex, delayed feedback loops (Kelly, 1995).  
Even if there is no significant average increase in prey compared to hunting 
alone, a group advantage is nevertheless observable: The standard deviation and not 
the mean is the relevant parameter in ultimate evaluations. It is reduced by (n)½ in 
accordance with group size, if we compare the standard deviation of individual results 
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 with that of group averages. This statistical prediction was empirically confirmed by 
Badke-Schaub (1994).   Several persons hunting collectively may catch greater 
animals, thereby heightening average individual outcomes. Yet at the same time, a 
large prey could also escape and by doing so, absorb the energy spent by these 
cooperating individuals. Even if each hunter did not catch more prey on average than if 
alone, the risk of not being provided with enough food within a specific time period 
would still decrease.  Furthermore, the risk of hunting more animals than necessary is 
also reduced. The extreme values are eliminated in a group context if the prey is divided 
equally among members. Statistically, the distribution of meat per hunter surrounds the 
group mean more narrowly than the distribution of meat per hunter over n single 
hunters. As a consequence, the mean value does not adequately describe group 
performance on complex tasks from an ultimate perspective. Instead, it is more 
meaningful to investigate the standard deviation, because it better represents group 
advantages from the individual perspective. In groups with the same average, namely, 
the standard deviation is lower (Badke-Schaub, 1994). This is a statistical finding, but it 
has been confirmed in studies comparing individual and group performance on problem-
solving tasks. Even if an average gain in performance is not achieved in extremely 
complex conditions, reducing the standard deviation through group behavior is crucial 
for individual survival, because it increases the mean probability for survival by more 
consistently supplying food or in modern times, other resources. Solely interpreting 
mean performance values, therefore, results in false estimations. A group advantage 
will only become apparent through the standard deviation of performance in complex 
situations.  
Further, the group context does not only smooth performance variations on a 
single occasion, but also over a broader time span. From a proximate perspective, the 
lack of growth in performance quality appears to be a disadvantage, especially when a 
specific group is confronted only once with a particular task. If groups repeatedly have 
to solve problems of similar complexity, the standard deviation for performance is 
noticeably reduced, thereby decreasing the risk of, in the instance of hunting, starvation. 
Theoretically considered, the question is under which conditions each parameter, i.e. 
mean and standard deviation, best describes group performance? If the group context 
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 offers members a performance gain on average, it helps single members to survive. If 
there is no such average individual gain, the second moment of the distribution, i.e. the 
standard deviation, must be inspected to decide whether this parameter indicates an 
individual advantage. Therefore, only after inspecting the first moment, i.e. the mean, 
will the second moment become relevant for ultimately evaluating advantages. 
    
Table 5 
Creative Performance from Proximate and Ultimate Perspectives 
 Performance types compared 
Evaluation style Empirical Baseline 
Proximate evaluation aOge = C * nw Ogb = C * n 
Ultimate evaluation Os / Is   =C Oge / Ig = Oge / nw
 
Note. O: Performance / output as a probability (Oge: group output as an empirical estimation and Ogb: as a 
baseline measure; Os: individual output in single context); C: Probability of individual performance 
(creativity); n: Group size; w: Efficiency parameter; w<1; I: Individual input in a group (Ig) and single (Is) 
context; Os /Is: Relationship between individual input (creativity) and individual output in a single condition; 
Oge/Ig: Relationship between individual input (creativity) and group output in a group situation. For 
example: If w=0.61 (Zysno, 1998) and n = 5, then  
Oe= 2.67 C . Thus, O/I = 1.64 C with n/nw =1.64.  
a w < 1. 
 
                      
Proximate and Ultimate Evaluation Styles: A General Comparison 
 
The proximate evaluation style represents optimal criteria for judging group 
performance and, as Steiner (1972) states, refers to potential group performance (Ogb). 
Such evaluations compare empirical (Oge) to potential (Ogb) group output. They neglect 
the relation between individual input and output, solely drawing on the group level for 
performance assessment. These statistical models (Ogb) and empirical results (Oge) on 
a group level constitute a method to proximately evaluate results for groups as a whole 
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 Considerable research was necessary to enable theoretical predictions on  expected 
group results, investigating simple assumptions such as group size, specific modes of 
information-sharing as well as the acceptance of correct solutions. Such models 
indicate what magnitude of performance expected when individual parameters are 
statistically aggregated. Here, the group always represents a theoretical basis, because 
comparing group with individual performance is considered unjustified and logically 
inadequate (Tindale & Larson, 1992a, b). What is lacking is a transposition of these 
group results back to the individual, thereby demonstrating that the group condition can 
lead to an individual advantage. Comparing single to group performance reveals an 
increase in relative output for individuals working in a group. When focusing on 
individual survival and reproduction,  
group-level evaluations are not appropriate to assess performance from an 
ultimate perspective, especially if the concept of group selection is explicitly refused. 
Group level is primarily qualified for judging the tightly-focused achievement of team 
goals. Individual behavior patterns in groups, adapted by evolution, need readjustment, 
because they are seldom optimal for proximately evaluated tasks, i.e. ones in which 
group output must succeed. In comparison with statistical models for proximately 
evaluating performance, evolutionary theory demands the concurrent consideration of 
two aspects to evaluate group performance: (a) the individual must represent the level 
of evaluation, and (b) the focus must be on the relation between input and output. From 
an evolutionary perspective, individual behavior strategies and a long-term perspective 
for individual behavior in a group need to considered. If an individual is able to achieve 
a better result performing in a group (Og/Ig) than alone (Os/Is), these behavior patterns 
will increasingly occur due to their reproductive value. In analogy to the Hamilton 
criterion for evaluating altruistic behavior (Hamilton, 1964; 1964a), the ultimate 
evaluation style can be formulated as follows: If (Og/Ig) > (Os/Is), the group situation 
represents an individual advantage, thereby optimizing reproduction probability. There 
is no need for the concept of group selection (Williams, 1966; Yeager, 2001) as Wilson 
claims (1997; Wilson & Sober, 1994; see also Sober & Wilson, 1998; Kameda & 
Tindale, 2006).  
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 The proximate evaluation of group performance mostly focused on comparisons 
between empirical (Oge) and potential results (Ogb) on a group level. Here, the group is 
often less successful than predicted Oge < Ogb. From the perspective of evolutionary 
theory, this evaluation style is fragmentary and lacks complexity, because the 
individual’s perspective is not considered. More extensive consideration would yield a 
comparison of individual results regarding individual input in a group (Og/Ig) and in a 
single (Os/Is) condition. Such a comparison would reveal a higher relative output in 
group contexts than in a single one: (Og/Ig) > (Os/Is). 
This can be due to the fact that individuals are capable of reducing their effort 
(input) in a group (Ig), but will achieve a better output (Og) than in a single context (Os) 
due to the effort exerted by other members. Note that individual input (Ig) should only be 
reduced maximally to (Og/Ig) = (Os/Is). Otherwise, a loss in total group output results and 
there is no individual benefit of performing in a group. However, this was not the case in 
the tasks discussed here. Most of them are one-dimensional in their influence on group 
members and they have a short duration. It also is conceivable that performance tasks 
of longer duration may affect individual input without the members’ control. In this case, 
the equation (Og/Ig) = (Os/Is) holds, but a second criterion generates the ultimate 
advantage, i.e. the reduction of the (Og/Ig) standard deviation in a group condition.  
Group hunting, for example, represents an ultimate advantage, because individual food 
supply in a group is less dependent on complex influences than in an individual context.  
 
Implications for Evaluating Group Processes 
 
Both evaluation styles, proximate and ultimate, are not comparable. Proximate 
evaluations refer to an optimal criterion describing group performance, i.e. Oge 
compared to Ogb. Ultimate evaluations refer to a combination of individual effort and 
individual performance in a group context, and draw on the individual context as a 
comparison level, i.e. Og/Ig compared to Os/Is. Assuming that group behavior has 
adapted due to evolution, the empirically observed results can be expected in naturally 
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 interacting groups, because they represent a selection advantage (Kameda & Tindale, 
2006).  
To optimize individual behavior patterns in group contexts, inherited interaction 
processes must be “invalidated”. Group interaction requires facilitation with appropriate 
techniques (Witte, 2001; 2007), and the innate reduction of individual effort in a group 
context (Ig) must be compensated. The conditions assumed in statistical models of 
proximate group behavior can be established by external intervention, suppressing 
genetically evoked automatic reactions. The usefulness of these techniques requires 
careful revision. For example, the brainstorming technique as proposed by Osborne 
(1957) did not prove successful (Stroebe & Diehl, 1994). The general idea of facilitation, 
however, is unbeaten (Nijstadt, Stroebe & Lodewijkx, 2002; Nijstadt, Stroebe & 
Lodewijkx, 2003; Witte, 2007). Proximately evaluated disadvantages of group 
interaction do not conflict with ultimate advantages; they merely depend on different 
evaluation criteria. Moreover, small group researchers should expect these performance 
losses from an ultimate perspective. As experts for group dynamics, our task is to 
develop techniques leading to proximate advantages in groups, thereby enabling the 
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